Posterior human wealth discrepancies are found to be the best predictor of reported job satisfaction. Static models of relative utility and other subjective well-being assumptions are all unambiguously rejected by the data, as well as an "economic" model in which job satisfaction is a measure of posterior human wealth. The "posterior choice" model readily explains why so many people usually report themselves as happy or satisfied, why both younger and older age groups are insensitive to current earning discrepancies, and why the past weighs more heavily than the present and the future.
Introduction
People often express judgments of satisfaction or dissatisfaction towards their own past experience of a brand, a¯lm, their job, the incumbent government, and even their whole life. What do these judgments mean and how can we make sense of them for predicting important economic behavior like sales of a new brand, strikes, quits, school enrollments, electoral outcomes, and even suicides?
Since opinions are often much easier to collect than ob jective data, the popularity of opinion surveys among marketing services, psychologists, political scientists and sociologists is hardly surprising.
But a ma jority of economists are still reluctant to use this abundant data, with a few notable exceptions (Hamermesh 1977 , Freeman 1978 , Borjas 1979 , and quite recently, Clark and Oswald 1994, 1996) . They view personal judgments of satisfaction and other sub jective opinions as a black box that should be opened only by psychologists and sociologists. But, on the other hand, they are not happy with the stories told by the latter as they contradict the accepted, and otherwise successful, theory of utility.
What do psychologists, sociologists and a few daring economists have to say about self reported job satisfaction? First of all, they interpret this judgment as a direct measure of the utility or well-being felt by the respondent. Should this measure be ordinal or cardinal is an unsettled question, but whatever position is taken on this issue, the sensitive problem of interpersonal utility comparisons has to be tackled. Once we make these steps, we have no other choice than accepting the discomforting story that money alone does not buy satisfaction.
More than twenty years ago, Duncan (1975) and Easterlin (1973 Easterlin ( , 1975 have provided descriptive statistics showing that, under the above interpretation, raising the incomes of all does not increase the happiness of all. This¯nding has been replicated on many occasions. For example, Scitovsky (1992) reports for the U.S. that over a period of 25 years where per capita income rose by 62%, \the proportion of people who consider themselves very happy, fairly happy and not too happy has hardly changed at all". These studies have also suggested that the individual's ranking in the income distribution of an economy, or relative income, has a signi¯cant impact on the level of well-being. Easterlin (1995) provides a synthesis of recent evidence. Partly as a result of the poor predictability of economic factors, researchers have turned to psychological theories of \sub jective well-being" (SWB), that adopt \non economic" utility functions in which enters 1 some sort of discrepancy between ob jective conditions of life (e.g., income, consumption) and a sub jectively de¯ned reference. Under various assumptions about the reference, SWB theories are consistent with the Duncan-Easterlin observations while the conventional economic view is not.
Our¯rst objective in this paper is to reconsider the competing, economic and non economic, interpretations of reported (job) satisfaction as felt utility. We extend previous work by specifying lifetime utility, and a semi-°exible functional form which nests a variety of (broadly de¯ned) SWB hypotheses: relative utility (among others, Van Praag 1968, Van de Stadt et alii 1985 , Hamermesh 1977 , social comparison (e.g., Veblen 1899 , Duesenberry 1962 , Clark and Oswald 1996 , cognitive dissonance (e.g., Festinger 1957 , Gilad et alii 1987 , disappointment (e.g., Loomes and Sugden 1986) , and loss aversion (Tversky and Kahneman 1991) .
The main result of our econometric tests on Canadian cross-sectional data is that the parsimonious assumption of relative utility should be accepted, and both the economic model and other SWB hypotheses rejected.
Our second ob jective is to specify an econometric model that beats the benchmark of relative utility, and to restore the power of microeconomic theory, by taking a life cycle's view of job's choice and by giving a new ordinal interpretation of happiness and satisfaction judgments. We achieve these two tasks in the paper. Speci¯cally, we argue that the job satisfaction reported in questionnaires is always conditional on the individual's having previously chosen and experienced that job. It is the mere judgment that the respondent would now repeat his past choice if he had to choose again. We view reported job satisfaction not as a measure of felt utility, but as a potential choice conditional on past experiences which may be simply called a posterior choice of own job. The latter choice is conditional on available information at the time of the survey including the \surprises" which occurred since the time of the choice. Moreover, we maintain that communication in the form of reporting satisfaction or dissatisfaction in a questionnaire is fundamentally an act, which reveals an ordinal preference exactly like the purchase of an item would. The reason is that, if you wish to make yourself understood by other persons with whom you communicate but who cannot feel physically what you feel, you must convey messages that have an ordinal value because only the latter will mean the same to all. The life cycle model which we derive from this new interpretation in the paper is consistent with the earlier¯ndings of Duncan and Easterlin but also makes new stark predictions, con¯rmed by the data. It readily explains why so many persons usually report themselves as happy or satis¯ed, why they are typically more satis¯ed with their job than with their pay or with the government; why the frequency of those reporting job satisfaction increases (is U -shaped) with age; why job satisfaction negatively correlates with voluntary quits and union a±liation; why current earnings discrepancies have hardly any in°uence on job satisfaction in both the younger and the older age-groups; and why past earnings discrepancies weigh more heavily than current ones on job satisfaction. The posterior choice model also demonstrates that reported job satisfaction has two components, one of which is backward-looking and known with certainty, and the other is forward-looking and based on a personal expectation. Obviously, the weights of these two components change drastically over the life cycle and this has interesting implications. Finally, in avoiding the need to assume equivalence of scales of reported satisfaction or happiness across individuals, we widen the range of qualitative data that are amenable to economic analysis in such¯elds as job mobility, job matching, individual responses to changing incentives and nonpecuniary rewards and other sorts of human behavior (for other applications to consumer choice, fairness and paradoxes to the theory of riskless choice, see L ¶ evy-Garboua and Montmarquette 1996a, 1996b).
Section 2 introduces the theory of job satisfaction as felt utility with a lifetime extension of the neoclassical utility model and a discussion of the sub jective well-being models. Section 3 develops the theory of reported job satisfaction as a posterior choice. Section 4 introduces the data and earnings functions that we use later to estimate reference earnings, earnings discrepancies, and past earnings from cross-sectional data. Section 5 describes the econometric speci¯cations of the models and some related estimation problems. Section 6 presents the estimates of reported job satisfaction consistent with seven SWB assumptions, posterior choice, and lifetime utility. Section 7 concludes.
2. Job satisfaction as felt utility: Theory
The Lifetime Utility Model
The standard microeconomic theory considers that individuals have a de¯nite lifetime indirect utility function:
where U stands for lifetime utility, H for (human) wealth, and u is a vector of non-pecuniary amenities, hours of work (e®ort) and utilities from other spheres of life. 1
The interesting feature about studying job satisfaction rather than, say, happiness about life is that (human) wealth acts in (1) as a potentially measurable subutility of an ob jective nature. This o®ers a unique opportunity for testing alternative theories of utility in a direct fashion as will be done here. What has been estimated in the literature, however, is not equation (1) but a static approximation of it, like U = U (y; u), in which y designates current earnings (net of education and training costs). This static utility model is admittedly very coarse but it is easily estimated on cross-section data.
The question arises whether the felt utility reported by an individual of given age is forward-looking, which is the way economists tend to think about it (e.g., Hamermesh 1977 
The¯rst term is the discounted sum of all past and current earnings. It has the crucial property of being known with certainty by respondents and, thus, does not rest on the latter's idiosyncratic way of forming expectations. Equation (2) describes job satisfaction as the sum of this backward-looking component 3 and
Prices of goods and interest rates, which have no variability on cross-sectional data, are not reported in equation (1).
This approach was adopted in an earlier version of the paper (L ¶ evy-Garboua and Montmarquette 1994).
! "Backward-looking" is a convenient but partly inappropriate expression. In equation (2), 4 the more conventional forward-looking component. The weight of these two parts varies systematically over the life-cycle : the forward looking part dominates for the younger group, and the backward looking part dominates for the older group.
According to equation (2), the regression coe±cient of current earnings should decrease with experience; this prediction is not supported by the forward-looking utility model. This o®ers a very convenient way to test which of these two interpretations is to be preferred as will be done is section 6. Things are slightly more complicated, though, because the unobservable expected future earnings will be correlated with current earnings. Training and deferred payment schemes will create a downward bias on the coe±cient of current earnings in the earlier career because current earnings will then be negatively correlated with future earnings.
Therefore, it seems wise for testing the theory to distinguish at least three periods of life : (i) early career; (ii) mid-career; (iii) late career. The relation of current earnings with job satisfaction is expected to be inversely U -shaped across age groups.
The lifetime utility model (in anyone of its two versions) highlights the basic inability of the standard economic approach to explain the following stylized facts :
1. uniform economic growth does not increase reported happiness and job satisfaction (among others, Easterlin (1973 Easterlin ( , 1975 Easterlin ( , 1995 and Duncan (1975) );
2. the frequency of reported job satisfaction typically increases with age (this point will be con¯rmed by table 4);
3. according to a few studies (e.g., Clark 1993, Clark and Oswald 1996) , women and lower-educated workers seem to be more satis¯ed with their job although they receive lower wages on average.
All of these facts (the third set should be taken with more caution than thē rst two) are plainly contradicted by the lifetime utility model 4 , although the two last refutations were concealed in previous discussions by the widespread use of the theoretically unattractive static form of the utility model.
it describes a posterior forward-looking view of the known past and present, an interpretation that truly anticipates our discussion of section 3. At this stage of the analysis, it could still be argued alternatively that the past and the future should both be discounted from the present period. Such ambiguity is one of the conceptual di±culties raised by the treatment of reported satisfaction as a direct measure of felt utility. Whatever interpretation is chosen will be tested in section 6.3 but the latter will, in fact, be more badly rejected than the former. " Uniform economic growth will raise current and future earnings in equation (2). Under steady growth, job satisfaction should also be the greatest for younger generations. Finally, permanently higher wages should produce greater job satisfaction. 5 2.2. Sub jective well-being models
The basic refutation of the static and lifetime utility models has led many social scientists to rely on alternative theories, further designated as SWB models. The latter form a rather heterogeneous family, but they can all be summarized by a modi¯ed utility function :
Equation (3), which substitutes for (1), incorporates an additional argument H ¤ that symbolizes some reference (human) wealth. The word \reference" wealth and earnings has received in the literature at least three di®erent meanings. Hamermesh (1977) considers market opportunities to be the natural economic reference and describes it by the individual's reservation (next best) human wealth. Theories of interdependent preferences, pioneered by Veblen (1899) and Duesenberry (1949) , emphasize the comparison of one's wealth to that of other similar persons. An ordinalist version of the theory has been recently applied to job satisfaction by Clark and Oswald (1996) , and a cardinalist version of relative utility was suggested a long time ago by Van Praag (1968) and his Dutch colleagues (a recent evidence is Van de Stadt, Kapteyn and Van de Geer 1985) , to construct subjective poverty scales. The theory of interdependent preferences may be held either in a weak form or in a strong form. The proposition that favorable and unfavorable comparisons, symmetrically, have an impact on satisfaction and dissatisfaction judgments, tested by Clark and Oswald (1996) , is the weak form.
The assessment that only unfavorable comparisons or envious feelings matter determines the strong form (Brenner (1983) ) 5 . Lastly, social researchers have pointed out that, in a dynamic setting, the most natural reference for an individual is perhaps his own prior expectation of wealth. Cohen and Axelrod (1984) argue # Duesenberry (1962:32) clearly favored the strong form but eventually shifted to the weak form in the formal statement of his theory: \The analysis of the forces causing impulses to consume shows that these arise when an individual makes an unfavorable comparison of his living standard with that of someone else. If these impulses must be rejected, the individual is dissatis¯ed with his position. [...] . Consequently, the dissatisfaction with his consumption standard which an individual must undergo is a function of the ratio of his expenditures to those of people with whom he associates.
Thus if C i is the consumption expenditure of one individual and U i is his utility index, we may write U i = U i (C i = P ® ij C j ) where C j is the consumption of the j th individual and ® ij is the weight applied by the i th consumer to the expenditure of the j th ". The strong form of Duesenberry's theory is obtained by assuming that ® ij = 0 whenever C j · C i .
that individuals adapt their preferences after observing pleasant and unpleasant surprises, i.e. discrepancies between expected utility and experienced utility. Loomes and Sugden (1986) contend that the feelings of disappointment and elation arouse respectively when expectations have not been met or have been superseded. Gilad, Kaish and Loeb (1987) set the general form of utility functions consistent with the psychological theory of cognitive dissonance. According to the latter, initiated by Festinger (1957) , people choose to believe that they are satis¯ed in spite of a bad experience by ignoring the dissonant information. It takes a \very" bad surprise to adjust to reality. Finally, Tversky and Kahneman (1991) (4) is :
+°" i ; the simplest modi¯ed utility which nests the standard utility is :
where°1 and°2 are allowed to be unequal. Equation (5) is a linear form of the social comparison model when 0 ·°1 <°2, which boils down to the pure relative utility model when°1 = 0: However, many of the mentioned SWB models include non-linear e®ects of earnings discrepancies. The following piece-wise linear form is a fairly°exible way of introducing nonlinearities while nesting equations (4) and (5) :
D is a dummy variable equal to 1 when ¡µ¾ " · " i < 0; that is when the di®erence between realized and reference wage is negative and smaller or equal Let J a be an ordinal index of job satisfaction at age a. We de¯ne 8 > < > :
where (u ¤ ) u designates the (reservation) value of non pecuniary determinants of utility. The analysis is easily extended when more than two answers are allowed (as was the case in the survey we used), by considering several alternative answers in decreasing order of value. Assuming a binary answer without loss of generality, we report (2) into (7) and write the following condition for reporting job satisfaction:
Since the past is known with certainty, the individual's risk attitude does not a®ect the backward looking part of this expression. Thus, the posterior choice model predicts that reported satisfaction solely depends on discrepancies without being in contradiction with accepted economic theory.
The theory also predicts two of the three stylized facts spelled out in section 2. Uniform economic growth will not make anyone happier because it will raise all opportunities in equal proportions. The frequency of reported job satisfaction typically increases with age because rational individuals always choose the best job and, under rational expectations, they cannot be systematically wrong in the long run. The backward-looking component of expression (8) is thus likely to be permanently positive after reaching a su±cient number of years, while the forward-looking component converges towards zero. The upward-sloping relationship of job satisfaction with age is not necessarily monotonic, though, and it may be U-shaped. Contrary to Hamermesh (1977) , this result does not require any job speci¯city of human investments. On the other hand, the model does not predict any systematic e®ect of sex or education on job satisfaction, ceteris 9 paribus. Being a man or a university graduate will tend to increase earnings permanently in all occupations, and this will not a®ect the sign of (8) unless it has a di®erential e®ect on the non-pecuniary value of jobs.
But the posterior choice model has even more to say. A stylized fact of previous studies of satisfaction judgments (including ours) is that responses are typically concentrated in the upper segments of the satisfaction scale (e.g., Campbell 1981, Krahn and Lowe 1988) . Most people usually report that they are happy or pretty happy! This well-known fact has often been overlooked on the ground that the satisfaction index is an arbitrary measure of SWB. Although this argument may not be quite convincing (why should researchers bother about satisfaction judgments if they are noise), it can no longer be addressed to us if we interpret reported satisfaction as a meaningful choice. Indeed, the rationality assumption implies that, under certainty, individuals always be satis¯ed with choices which they deliberately made. A corollary is that respondents would be less satis¯ed on average with experiences out of their control. A good instance is o®ered by the surveys on the political popularity of governments in democratic regimes. As a little half of respondents did not support the incumbent government in the polls, it is not surprising that so little consensus is usually found in these judgments.
Other convincing evidence is the fact that respondents report greater overall job satisfaction than pay satisfaction. The mean scores (standard deviations) found by Clark and Oswald (1996, data appendix) on a 1-7 scale were respectively 5.50
(1.51) and 4.49 (1.95). A suggested interpretation is that individuals control their job as a whole better than their pay, because choosing a job is a package deal whose single elements, like pay, cannot be freely and separately chosen.
Lastly, it should be noted that the \posterior choice" underlies no real decision, but it does point to some real decision. Omitting the non pecuniary value of jobs for simplicity, equations (7) and (8) Since the latter is proportional to earnings, we would have introduced a spurious correlation of y ¤ and ". This might be partly responsible for the weak in°uence of reference earnings on job satisfaction found in previous studies, holding the discrepancy term constant.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2 far as an econometrician who cannot rely on panel data will be happy enough to estimate the expected wage from cross-section, it will make a decent econometric guess for the individual's expected earnings. Therefore, all three de¯nitions of reference earnings are close to the age-speci¯c earnings predicted by a statistical earnings function. The earnings discrepancy is then simply the estimated residual of an earnings function. Note for instance that Hamermesh (1977) and Clark and Oswald (1996) have both adopted the same \statistical" method while using a di®erent concept of reference earnings. Keeping this in mind, we shall be able to test nine utility models against the null, which we simply call the \statistical" model. Moreover, these models are partially nested and this will permit selecting the best one, i.e. the most parsimonious non rejected model. All of the felt utility models of job satisfaction which will be tested are summarized in Table 3 .
[Insert Table 3 about here.]
Although Table 3 and Figure 1 describe the same reality, they have quite di®erent expositional virtues. Figure 1 helps us to distinguish SWB models at rst glance. On the other hand, Table 3 is a convenient frame for visualizing which model is nested in which.
The construction of lifetime earnings and reference earnings from cross-section data
A full test of the lifetime utility and posterior choice models requires knowledge of past earnings and reservation earnings. A static version of these would be empirically undistinguishable from the economic and relative utility models mentioned in Table 3 . Although panel data could solve this problem, we present here a shortcut method which permits the construction of lifetime earnings from cross-section data. Most surveys being of the latter type, we believe it is important for the progress of future research to suggest a cheap and operational way of beating the static benchmark.
Ex ante job decisions are taken under uncertainty and surprises must inevitably occur with the passage of time. Our empirical strategy for the construction of past reservation earnings is to reconstitute individual surprises econometrically.
We acknowledge the fact that earnings surprises originate in the release of new information about the productivity of self and others and that one part of it correlates with life-cycle variables whose exact value is unknown in youth but gets determined sequentially. We divided the past and present in three periods for reasons mentioned below. Each period is characterized by a di®erent stock of information, the amount of available information increasing over time.
Periods might be of unequal length both within and between age-groups. Thē rst period is simply around school-leaving age. For most individuals, relevant information is then restricted to education level, gender and nationality. Rational career expectations should be based on just that, and the predictable returns 13 to experience.
Period 1 reservation earnings have been estimated from that information only and the coe±cients of the corresponding earnings functions appear in column 2 of Table 2 . While information is minimal at school-leaving age, it is maximal currently, and a natural de¯nition of currently available information is given by the complete list of variables which enter the age-speci¯c earnings functions reported in Table 2 . 6
Current reservation earnings have been calculated by imputing to each individual observed values of the latter variables and taking the coe±cients found in column 1. Since information is acquired sequentially, this methodology can also be used to estimate the reservation earnings of an intermediate period in
which the worker has a good idea of the factors which a®ect earnings but draws his comparison from a heterogeneous sample. Consequently, period 2 reservation earnings have been simulated by taking the coe±cients of column 1 and attributing to each worker the age-speci¯c average value of the variables, listed in column 1, which remain unknown by the workers at that time. 7
Having thus computed the three period reservation earnings ³ŷ 1;ŷ2;ŷ3´f or every individual (denoting the school-leaving period by 1 and the current period by 3), we now turn on to the estimation of own earnings in the same periods (y 1 , y 2 , y 3 ). The end-period earnings, y 3 ; are currently observed in the sample.
As for the remaining two past periods, we consistently de¯ne : y 2 =ŷ 3 ; y 1 =ŷ 2 ,
from the assumption that the updating of an individual's opportunities with experience follows his discovery of ever more complete information about his $ The statistical variables which are meant to capture the release of new information through the life-cycle appear in column 1. They include measures of the time allocated to work (JOBWKS, WPART, LTDS), place of residence (ONT), marital status (MARRD, DIVOR), health (HEDS), religion status (NOREL), and socio-economic status (WSSP, WSTF). We are conscious that it is not common practice in the human capital literature to include socio-economic status in the earnings function since it is, at least in part, a choice variable. But the aim pursued here is not to obtain consistent estimates of the returns to education and experience. It is rather to get a close econometric simulation of an individual's reference earnings by taking the mean earnings of a sample of \similar" persons. Presumably, age and broadly de¯ned elements of socio-economic attainment are basic indicators of similarity with respect to job.
% This concerns all the variables except gender, education level, nationality and experience (and the square).
personal situation. Another way of justifying (9) is to say that an individual's reference earnings in any period but the¯rst one should be his own earnings one period back.
Cross-sectional estimates for past (reservation) earnings should be corrected for the spurious e®ect of experience between the period in the past and the period of the survey. Taking age-group-speci¯c earnings and job satisfaction functions allows us to control for much of this e®ect by addition of a constant term. The further introduction of experience (EXPER) among the explanatory variables of the job satisfaction equation produced no signi¯cant result and was eventually abandoned. This brings another motivation for splitting the sample by age-group.
Finally, we consider four successive periods in the past for the lifetime utility model by application of equation (9) ( 1 1 ) with" 3i = y 3i ¡ŷ 3i ;" 2i =ŷ 3i ¡ŷ 2i ;" 1i =ŷ 2i ¡ŷ 1i .
If job satisfaction is partly backward-looking, it is expected that the coe±cients of earnings in (10) and the coe±cients of earnings discrepancies in (11) decrease over time :
In both equations (10) and (11), the error term & i captures the forward-looking part of human wealth (discrepancy), unobserved variables and measurement errors. Since the present value of future lifetime earnings declines with experience, the variance of the error term in equations (10) and (6) must also decline with experience if reported job satisfaction is to be interpreted as felt utility.
Consequently, all our regressions will be corrected for heteroskedasticity. The foregoing analysis must be adapted to the posterior choice model described by equation (11). As a matter of fact, the present value of future lifetime earnings discrepancies would only decline with experience if the latter were positively correlated, and we know that this will frequently, but not necessarily, happen.
So, heteroskedasticity may once more be a problem.
The problem of using generated regressors
Past earnings and earnings discrepancies, which enter as explanatory variables in the job satisfaction equations, are estimates drawn from age-group-speci¯c earnings functions. For instance, the earnings discrepancy " i is obtained as the residual of : y i = W i¸+ " i ; (12) in which it is assumed that W 0 i is a set of exogenous variables independent of " i .
Ideally, we want to estimate jointly the determinants of job satisfaction and (reference) earnings. The presence, however, of a discrete variable in the job satisfaction equation and, the additional di±culty of dealing with unobserved past earnings for the posterior choice and lifetime utility models convert a simple computational problem into a rather complex one. An alternative is to consider two-stage estimators. Unfortunately, as shown by Pagan (1984 Pagan ( , 1986 , McAleer and McKenzie (1991) among others, generally in the context of linear models, these two-stage and related estimators could have severe limitations including e±ciency losses. In some cases, inconsistency could result for nonlinear models.
All models considered here are vulnerable on that last account, but one can expect to improve consistency by assuming that E (& i " i ) = 0 (also an identifying restriction for some models). This weak exogeneity assumption 8 presumes that the unobserved determinants of earnings should be uncorrelated with the unobserved determinants of job satisfaction. Such assumption should be veri¯ed by discrepancy models inasmuch unobserved determinants of earnings, like ability, have an equal e®ect on reference earnings and thus do not a®ect the future earnings discrepancies which form the ma jor component of S i . On the other hand, it is more problematic if the true model is the economic model (in either static, or lifetime version), the relative utility, or the social comparison model (in either weak or strong form). Moreover, the above assumption might be invalidated by the presence of job speci¯c investments and e±ciency wage incentives.
Parametric two-step estimators substitute for the latent regressors in (6), (10) & See Engle, Hendry and Richard (1983) for a discussion of weak exogeneity. ³ v 2 ¡ r 2 + P w 2; i " 2;i´+ Ã 3 P w 3;i " 3;i : (13) The v and r are additional error terms due to our estimates of the observed and reservation earnings in periods 2 and 1 based on current data (period 3).
Under the null, H 0 : Ã j = 0 for all j 0 s, the two-step procedure yields consistent and e±cient estimates. For Ã j 6 = 0, the error term is non-spherical causing not only an e±ciency problem, but some parameter estimates might be inconsistent in the context of a discrete dependent variable. Some corrections for the heteroskedasticity problem will be proposed, and likelihood ratio tests will be used for statistical inferences.
Comparable speci¯cations can be derived for the lifetime utility, and static SWB models by substitutingŷ for y ¤ and" for " into equation (10) and (6). In the previous empirical literature on job satisfaction, this problem of generated regressors has been completely ignored.
Empirical results on job satisfaction
Our estimation of equations (6), (10) and (11) rests on an ordered probit model 9
to account for the categorical nature of the dependent variable.
10 Let J i be the ' The ordered probit model is presented in Maddala (1983) and was¯rst estimated by McKelvey and Zavoina (1975) . Greene (1995, 480) discusses the technical details of integrating the heterosckedasticity in the basic model.
The discreteness of the statistical measure of reported job satisfaction conforms well with the conventional and unconventional (eg. Hamermesh 1977 , Clark 1993 ) theories of ordinal utility. Defendors of a cardinalist conception must face the problem of converting an ordinal statement onto a cardinal scale. They solve it by asking respondents to evaluate their feelings on a detailed Likert-type scale (for instance, Michalos (1985) uses a 7-point scale: terrible=1,..., delightful=7). Psychologists usually treat the stated rank as a continuous variable. Van de Stadt at alii (1985) use the more sophisticated information maximization argument of Van Praag (1968) . [see Krahn and Lowe (1988) ] and is predicted by the posterior choice model.
In Table 4 , we present the level of satisfaction by age-groups. It can be seen that the proportion of fully satis¯ed individuals increases with age as predicted by the same model.
[Insert Table 4 The independence between the level of satisfaction and gender of the respondent is never rejected as predicted by the posterior choice model. These two results are at variance with the recent¯ndings of Clark and Oswald (1996) and Clark (1993) on British data, which seems to imply that job tastes do not systematically di®er by education and gender. The lack of robustness of these e®ects leaves little substance to ad hoc determinations of job satisfaction in comparison with discrepancy factors.
Test of SWB models:
We obtained ordered probit estimates for all the felt utility models. Tables 5a and 5b respectively, are less negative.
[Insert Table 5A about here.] In the 25-34 age group, likelihood ratio tests indicate that all felt utility models are preferred to the restricted log likelihood associated with the null with p-values less than 1%. However, all economic and SWB models are not equally For example, for the loss aversion model, the proportional factor¯xing the range of each dummy variable is set to _ µ = 1:5 for the negative earnings discrepancies while Á = 1. On the other models µ = Á = 1. These values yield a su±cient number of observations for all categories. Di®erent values were tried without modifying the results.
EXPER is a variable used in the¯rst stage of the estimation procedure and has a relatively large variance. Di®erent variables and a combination of variables were also tried without improving the correction given by EXPER.
good. A simple t-test rejects the assumption that°1 =°2 and accepts°1 <°2, but a likelihood ratio test rejects any di®erence between the two models 13 . In turn, the unrestricted log likelihoods of the social comparison (weak form), the cognitive dissonance II, the disappointment-elation and the loss aversion models are statistically no di®erent from the restricted log likelihood of the parsimonious relative utility model. The loop is closed to favor the relative utility model when we note that the disappointment-elation model is preferred to the restricted social comparison (strong form) model (p-value = 0.0064), and the cognitive dissonance II model is preferred to the restricted cognitive dissonance I model (p-value= 0.00075). In the relative utility model, 14 a positive (negative) discrepancy will positively (negatively) in°uence the utility.
[Insert Table 5B To summarize, all of the static utility models are rejected against the null (which simply relates job satisfaction to statistical determinants of taste like gender and education) in the younger and in the older age groups. In the two ! The loglikelihoods of the economic model are reported in ** of Tables 5A and  5B. " The relative utility model is empirically undistinguishable from the di®erential satisfaction hypothesis of Hamermesh (1977) , and from the surprise model of Cohen and Axelrod (1984) although earlier discussion has shown that the use of generated regressors may raise less problems if one of the latter models is the true one. 20 intermediate age-groups, a simple discrepancy model fares better than the null and cannot be rejected against any other SWB hypothesis. However, the conventional economic model relating job satisfaction to earnings cannot be ruled out, at this stage, in the 35-44 age-group.
It was mentioned earlier that the use of generated regressors cannot throw doubt on the test when the theory is to be rejected. Therefore, social comparison (in weak and strong form), cognitive dissonance (I and II), disappointment-elation, and loss aversion do not appear to be promising tracks for understanding job satisfaction in view of the complication added by these theories.
Of course, some of these theories are perhaps better suited to the analysis of choices under risk and other domains of behavior for which they were primitively designed.
Disappointment-elation is a case at hand. Our claim is simply that none of the more complicated utility functions involving discrepancy terms that have been suggested in the literature is a better predictor of job satisfaction than a linear function of earnings discrepancy. Nor is the conventional economic model. Table 6 presents the results of the posterior choice model for all age-groups. Wē rst note, once more, that it does not perform better than the statistical model in the 15-24 and 45+ age-groups, but this is now consistent with the lifetime interpretation (see the discussion in 2.1). Also predicted by this model, the coe±cient of the current earnings discrepancy b " 3 is inversely U -shaped and the peak is attained by the 25-34 age-group. The same observations could have been made from tables 5A and 5B about relative utility models, but were not predicted by the latter. In order to make a crucial empirical distinction between both interpretations, it is necessary to look at the coe±cients of past earnings discrepancies," 1 and" 2 . The fact that they appear with the correct sign, are also signi¯cant in the intermediate age groups (at the 5% level in the 25-34 age group and at the 10% level in the 35-44 age group), and follow the inverse U -shaped pattern across age-groups, is highly supportive of our new
Test of the posterior choice model:
interpretation. An even more decisive argument is supplied by the log likelihood test: in the middle age-groups, the unrestricted loglikelihood of the posterior choice model is statistically signi¯cantly greater (p values=0.0069 and 0.0219 in the 25-34 and 35-44 age-groups respectively) than the restricted log likelihood of the relative utility model. It seems to be the¯rst time that a new model has been able to beat the benchmark of simple discrepancy theories! Furthermore, this result has been obtained in spite of the presumably great imprecision of the cross-section estimates for past earnings discrepancies, which drives the related coe±cients towards zero.
The ranking of the three coe±cients of past and current earnings discrepancies provides new strong evidence in favor of the posterior choice model. In conformity with theoretical predictions, it is found that a discrepancy's e®ect on reported job satisfaction is the greater the more distant it was experienced in the past. This pattern is exactly observed in three age-groups, and the coe±cients of" 1 and" 3 are truly apart. The only violation concerns an age group (15-24) for which the prediction was not reliable for two reasons: the incidence of human investments and other deferred payment schemes in early career, and the \thinness of past"
for recent school-leavers. As it is, the set of results should be quite convincing because it runs counter the loose intuition that more remote events should be discounted.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
One interesting feature of the posterior choice model is the theoretical possibility of retrieving, from the coe±cients of the time varying earnings discrepancy variables, the rate of interest (or time preference) for the average individual in our sample. Unfortunately, the periods that correspond to the three estimated discrepancies are not de¯ned with any precision, so that any calculation is highly speculative without panel data. The main impression that emerges from the data, at this stage, is that the average discount rate is substantially greater in the early career than later on.
All the estimations, for both the felt utility models and the posterior choice model, were done correcting for multiplicative heteroskedasticity of the second stage estimation with the experience variable, EXPER. The coe±cient estimates of this variable are always negative and statistically signi¯cant for some regressions (see Table 5B and 6). The negative value suggests that the residual variance in the level of reported job satisfaction decreases with the labor market experience of the individuals. This result is consistent with the fact that the forward looking part of human wealth discrepancy (see equation (8) It is possible to rewrite the deterministic part of equation (11), i.e. the posterior choice model, into equation (10) since the earnings discrepancies are simple combinations ofŷ 1 ,ŷ 2 ,ŷ 3 , and y 3 . One gets:
Ã 1 (ŷ 2 ¡ŷ 1 ) + Ã 2 (ŷ 3 ¡ŷ 2 ) + Ã 3 (y 3 ¡ŷ 3 ) = ¡Ã 1ŷ1 + (Ã 1 ¡ Ã 2 )ŷ 2 + (Ã 2 ¡ Ã 3 )ŷ 3 + Ã 3 y 3 ; which must be juxtaposed to: ' 1ŷ1 + ' 2ŷ2 + ' 3ŷ3 + ' 4 y 3 :
The pattern of coe±cients observed in table 7 emerges from the theoretical prediction that Ã 1 > Ã 2 > Ã 3 > 0. Thus we should have ' 1 < 0; ' 2 > ' 3 > 0; and ' 4 > 0. Moreover, we check that ' 4 = Ã 3 by comparing the related coe±cients from tables 6 and 7. Other comparisons, and especially ' 1 = ¡Ã 1 , are obviously more fuzzy but of the same order of magnitude.
[Insert Table 7 about here] In summary, the lifetime utility model is unambiguously rejected in favor of the posterior choice model. 15
Concluding remarks
A new theory should be preferred to the conventional wisdom when it predicts more facts, rests on fewer ad hoc assumptions, and when the prior model is # We may add a little spice to this conclusion by noticing that both models fare equally well in terms of loglikelihood (which is no surprise).
consistently rejected by the data against the new one. On all these accounts, considerable evidence found in this paper indicates that, when someone reports his satisfaction with something that he has experienced, he does not really communicate the number of utils that he felt, but rather states his own preference for that thing over his best alternative conditional on what he knows and expects of both, at this time.
In simple words, reporting one's satisfaction is the judgment that one would now repeat one's past experience if one had to choose again. Under certainty and stable preferences, one would always be satis¯ed with an unconstrained and deliberate decision made in the past. It is merely the occurrence of surprises and constraint changes which makes the posterior preference deviate from the prior.
This new interpretation does not invalidate the empirical¯ndings of psychological and sociological research on the subject, which emphasized the role of discrepancies between ob jective conditions and a reference on reported satisfaction.
It is exactly what the new theory predicts. However, this important result does not require utility to be relative and comparable across persons, because choice and preference are obviously relative and ordinal concepts. These two corollaries put together indicate that, in Festinger's mind, comparison would be a proxy for such information when the latter was not available or too costly; and thus comparison with most similar persons would be a way of evaluating one's best alternative. Festinger suggested an information-based argument for social comparison, not a theory of interdependent preferences. a Coefficients significant at the 10 % (5%) level, two tails (one tail) when appropriate.
b
The variables that are significant in the Z vector are generally the same as those reported in Table 6 . The threshold parameter * is significant in each age-group. The coefficient of the variable EXPER to account for the heteroskedasticity 1 is negative but insignificant in each age-group. Statistical ( ( =(   4  5  2 
